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purpose of Chinese local governments to compromise the rights
revolution in the Chinese national expropriation regime. The concept
of "transferable development rights" (TDRs) is simple: development
rights from one parcel of land are lifted up and transferred to
another. Upon a detailed examination of land tickets in Chongqing
and Chengdu, the southwestern Chinese application of TDRs, this
article reveals that local governments in both cities have created
schemes of land tickets to circumvent the increasingly stringent
national regulation of local governments' expropriation power. But
by reframing such practices as for rural rights and welfare, they have
successfully gained acquiescence and even approval from the central
government, eventually leading to the creation of a national market
of land tickets. This case study demonstrates the "maximally protean
and easily reformable" nature of the "bundle of sticks" and cautions
against expanding the role of TDRs in China's land reform.
INTRODUCTION
The largest migration in human history is taking place in China:
in 1978, less than 20 percent of the Chinese population lived in cities;
today, the share is more than half. China's urbanization is projected
to reach about 70 percent - some 1 billion people - by 2030.1 In other
words, 400 million Chinese have moved from rural areas to cities in
the past four decades, and a further 600 million are expected to join
them by 2030. The problem is that people move, but land does not.
Exacerbating the situation is that people who have migrated cannot
sell their land or houses in the countryside, and are thus leaving them
unoccupied. To address this mismatch between property and people,
1International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The World Bank, and the
Development Research Center of the State Council, People's Republic of China, Urban
China: Toward Efficient, Inclusive, and Sustainable Urbanization *3 (2014), archived at
https://perma.cc/C43N-XCVW. See also John Givens, The Greatest Migration: China's
Urbanization (Huffington Post, Feb. 2, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/78V3-
QZJN.
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Chongqing2 and Chengdu,3 two major cities in southwestern China,
initiated reform schemes allowing land used for housing in faraway
villages to be converted to agricultural use and a corresponding
amount of farmland near towns to be used for urban expansion.4
These schemes in essence embrace the notion of "transferable
development rights" (TDRs), that is, the development rights for one
parcel of land being lifted up and transferred to another.5
The concept originated in the United States, with approximately
200 U.S. communities currently operating TDR programs in some
form.6 The common goals of TDR programs include farmland and
historic preservation, the protection of environmentally sensitive
land, and the promotion of urban density. Land owners are granted
TDRs as compensation for the development restrictions the
government has imposed on their land and can transfer those rights
to land developers who want to build somewhere else. The most
vivid illustration of TDR operation can be found in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City.7 After New York City rejected the
Penn Central Transportation Company's proposal to increase the
altitude of an existing building on the ground of preserving Grand
Central Terminal as an important landmark, the company was
2 Chongqing is the fourth provincial-level city under the direct administration of the
central government with over 30 million people and a territory of 82,269 square
kilometers. Chongqing Statistics Bureau, Chongqing Statistical Yearbook 2018 *4 (2018).
3 Chengdu is the capital city of Sichuan province with over 16 million people and a
territory of 14,335 square kilometers. Chengdu Statistics Bureau, Chengdu Statistical
Yearbook 2018 *343 (2018).
4 Reform's Big Taboo: An Ambitious Plan for Social Change Has Run into Trouble
(Economist, Mar. 26, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/WN68-UPVP.
5 Arthur C. Nelson, Rick Pruetz, and Doug Woodruff, The TDR Handbook: Designing
and Implementing Transfer of Development Rights Programs (Island 2013); Sarah J.
Stevenson, Banking on TDRs: The Government's Role as Banker of Transferable Development
Rights, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1329, 1329 (1998); John J. Costonis, The Disparity Issue: A
Context for the Grand Central Terminal Decision, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 402 (1977); John J.
Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 Yale L. J. 75 (1973).
6 Nelson, Pruetz, and Woodruff, The TDR Handbook at 131 (cited in note 5).
7 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law & Liberty
32019]
New York University Journal of Law & Liberty [Vol. 13:1
allowed to sell the "air space" to other developers who were not
subject to U.S. landmark laws.8
TDR programs in the United States have not achieved their
potential, at least not as envisioned by their architects. Even in New
York City, the TDR market is underdeveloped for a variety of
reasons, primarily limited by market demand owing to limited
receiving zones.9 In China, TDRs have been entrusted with an even
bigger ambition: to serve as the key to rural land reform, which is
currently enmeshed in the mutually conflicting goals of development
and preservation. On the one hand, local governments need land for
industrialization and economic development. On the other, the
central government is very concerned over the loss of arable land and
the increasing number of landless farmers in the wake of rapid
urbanization and industrialization. It has thus imposed a top-down
land use quota system according to which city governments are
allocated limited, and therefore precious, quotas for converting rural
land to urban land.
By linking the rural areas where migrant workers come from
with the urban areas where they work, farmers are encouraged to
reclaim their residential plots of land for the purpose of generating
the land use quotas that city governments need to convert rural land
near the city center to urban land for development. As a result, city
governments can obtain more land for development and,
presumably, should be willing to give farmers something in return.
That something could be cash paid for a land use quota, or it could
be an urban hukou,10 coming with it the legal resident status in the
city and the accompanying social welfare coverage.
However, it is unclear whether the various local reforms that
take the name of TDRs are intended to grant farmers development
8 Id. at 124.
9 See Vicki Been and John Infranca, Transferable Development Rights Programs: Post-
Zoning, 78 Brooklyn L. Rev. 435 (2012).
10 See, e.g., Kam Wing Chan and Will Buckingharn, Is China Abolishing the Hukou
System?, 195 China Q. 582 (2008).
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rights or are simply another - easier - way for local governments to
evade national laws and grab land from farmers. In the United States,
TDRs belong to the original land owners who have been deprived of
development rights owing to land use regulations. In Chinese local
practice, however, it remains questionable whether farmers have any
real control over the generation and transfer of land use quotas. For
example, with respect to residential plot reclamation, reports on
farmers being "forced to live upstairs"" indicates that they may not
have given up their plots voluntarily.
In 2018 the State Council Office promulgated an ordinance on the
transfer of land use quotas among provinces.12 The idea behind this
move was that relatively undeveloped provinces, particularly those
in northwestern China, could preserve more arable land, whereas
relatively developed provinces could use more land for development
by buying the farmer's land use quotas. Such a national market for
land use quotas is unprecedented anywhere in the world. The
policy's real impact is yet to be seen, but it seems that the national
government has embraced the idea of TDRs as a way of both
maintaining a balance between arable land preservation and
economic development while also promoting inter-regional equality.
It is therefore important to review existing regional practices in
China to better understand the theory and practice of TDRs.
Based on an in-depth empirical investigation of land tickets in
Chongqing and Chengdu, the southwestern Chinese application of
TDRs, this article reveals that local governments in both cities have
created schemes of land tickets to circumvent the increasingly
1" Yin Shuang, The Hidden Concern Behind "Farmers Being Forced to Be Upstairs (Guang
Ming Daily, Nov. 4, 2010), archived at https://perma.cc/Z2Z5-KK82 [(WA), "kii
1
2 Notice of the General Office of the State Council on Printing and Distributing the Inter-
provincial Supplementary Cultivated Land Management Measures and the Urban and Rural
Construction Land Increase and Decrease Linkage Savings Inter-provincial Transfer
Management Measures, General Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of
China (Mar. 10, 2019) [A PFk tM EN
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stringent national regulation of local governments' expropriation
power. But by reframing such practices as for rural rights and
welfare, they have successfully gained acquiescence and even
approval from the central government, with significant impact on the
central government policy to create a national market of land use
quotas. Land tickets in China face the same problems that TDRs do
in the United States: (1) the baseline entitlement is unclear; (2) they
are prone to manipulation by the government and are to serve as
camouflage for takings;13 and (3) a real market with a functioning
price mechanism is absent. In light of reforms aimed at granting
farmers the right to transfer construction land directly, in essence
taking their rights one step closer to fee simple,14 this article cautions
against expanding the role of TDRs in China's land reform.
The article is structured as follows. Section I investigates the
conceptual and institutional background of TDRs, particularly their
inherent connection with takings. Section II examines the mechanism
and market of land tickets, the southwestern Chinese application of
TDRs. Section III reveals how land reclamation, the first step to
generating land tickets, has become in practice another means of
expropriation that evades national laws and regulations constraining
local governments' expropriation power. Section IV explores the
institutional incentives of local governments that are experimenting
with TDRs. Finally, Section V concludes by cautioning against the
expansion of TDRs and calling for an alternative approach to land
reform in China.
13 See, e.g., William A. Fischel, Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics, and Politics 2
(Harvard 1995); Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of Regulatory Takings
Jurisprudence, 114 Yale L. J. 203 (2004).
14 Opinions of the State Council and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China
on Establishing and Perfecting the System, Mechanism and Policy System of Urban-Rural
Integration and Development, State Council of the People's Republic of China (Apr. 15,
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I. TDRs, TAKINGS, AND THE BUNDLE OF STICKS
Before looking more closely at TDR practices in China, we need
to understand them in the context of their broader. institutional
background and conceptual framework. TDRs are inherently
incoherent in nature, falling somewhere between property rights and
regulatory takings. The view of property rights underlying TDRs is
the "bundle of sticks" model, rather than the in rem conception. Both
the institutional background of TDRs and their place within the
bundle of sticks model have implications for TDR practices in China.
A. TDRs: BETWEEN TAKINGS AND PROPERTY RIGHTS
TDR programs in New York City and other U.S. cities owe many
of their features to the legal and conceptual frameworks developed
in the 1970s and 1980s by legal scholars John Costonis, Norman
Marcus, and David Alan Richards.1 5 These scholars viewed TDR
programs as a tool for helping to resolve the tensions between
development and preservation goals. They also saw unused
development potential as a community resource rather than a solely
private resource, an idea that shaped their proposals for how
municipalities should structure the transfer of development rights.
The desire to preserve resources -such as historic landmarks, open
space, and farmland - in areas facing strong developmental
pressures has been the principal motivation for TDR proposals in
New York City and elsewhere.16
However, as noted, TDRs are of a fundamentally incoherent
nature. In Penn Central v. New York City, 17 the most important
regulatory takings case of all time, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld
the historic preservation of Grand Central Terminal in part because
the city offset the burden of landmarking with a valuable new
15 Been and Infranca, Transferable Development Rights Programs (cited in note 9).
16 Id. at 435.
17 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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property interest-a TDR-that could be sold to a neighboring
property.
The case related to two separate issues. The first was whether the
regulation constituted a taking, and the other was whether just
compensation had been provided if a taking had occurred. The
majority opinion mixed the two issues. 18 The Supreme Court
confronted TDRs again in Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,19
in which Mrs. Suitum alleged that regulations preventing the
development of her property near Lake Tahoe were in effect a taking,
regardless of the availability of TDRs. The court's majority opinion
focused on the issue of ripeness, holding that the property owner did
not need to try to sell or transfer the TDRs to bring her claim.20 The
concurring opinion of Justice Scalia, joined by Justices O'Connor and
Thomas, revealed the incoherent nature of TDRs:
Putting TDRs on the takings rather than the just
compensation side of the equation is a clever, albeit
transparent, device that seeks to take advantage of a
peculiarity of our takings clause jurisprudence: whereas
once there is a taking, the Constitution requires just
compensation, a regulatory taking generally does not occur
so long as the land retains substantial value. If money that
the government regulator gives to the landowner can be
counted on the question of whether there is a taking, rather
than on the question of whether the compensation for the
taking is adequate, the government can get away with
paying much less.21
TDRs are therefore inherently related to land use control and
takings. On the one hand, we can view them as another kind of
18 Id. at 104.
19 520 U.S. 725 (1997).
2 Robert C. Ellickson and Vicki L. Been, Land Use Controls: Cases and Materials 166
(Aspen 3d ed. 2005).
21 Id. at 166.
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regulatory property rights similar to pollution permits. 22 On the
other, however, several questions arise out of the administrative
origin of TDRs.
The first is whether land use regulations themselves constitute
the deprivation of private property rights, and are therefore a
taking.23 The second is whether TDRs can compensate for the loss of
development value. Another way of phrasing this question is to ask
whether there is sufficiently strong demand for TDRs for their
owners to realize the value of those rights in the marketplace. On the
demand side, there is also the question of who the potential buyers
of TDRs are and why they need to buy TDRs for development. Does
the additional requirement of buying TDRs impose an unjust burden
on development? Even if we regard the use of TDRs as a flexible
instrument of land use control for the government, how should the
market be designed to ensure that it operates in a way that is
acceptable to both the suppliers and purchasers of TDRs? What
would happen if the demand for TDRs were so weak that their
owners' returns were insufficient to cover the loss of developmental
value?24
The final question that arises concerns the difference between the
use of TDRs in China and the United States, with the former adding
an additional step in TDR generation. Chinese local governments
require farmers to reclaim their residential land to generate a land
use quota, the Chinese counterpart of TDRs, and the process of
generating that quota via reclamation is susceptible to manipulation.
Might it constitute a taking? If reclamation plans are pushed through
by the government and conducted on a large scale, the likelihood that
farmers will lose control over their land is high. If local governments
22 See Christopher Serkin, Penn Central Take Two, 92 Notre Dame L. Rev. 913 (2016).
2 See, e.g., Mark Fenster, The Stubborn Incoherence of Regulatory Takings, 28 Stan. Envir.
L. J. 525 (2009); J. Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments for The Abolition of the Regulatory Takings
Doctrine, 22 Ecol. L. Q. 89 (1995); Barry Appleton, Regulatory Takings: The International
Law Perspective, 11 N.Y.U. Envtl. L. J. 35,35 (2002); Vicki Been and Joel C. Beauvais, The
Global Fifth Amendment-NAFTA's Investment Protections and The Misguided Quest for an
International Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 30 (2003).
24 Serkin, 92 Notre Darne L. Rev. at 913 (cited in note 22).
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fail to call such an exercise expropriation and in effect evade the laws
of expropriation, then farmers are left in an even worse position than
under conventional expropriation.
B. TDRs As ONE STICK IN TEif BUNDLE
Scholars disagree about whether property rights are in personam
rights or in rem rights. Traditionally, the in rem nature of property
was widely recognized as the correct conception. Most famously, Sir
William Blackstone defined property as "that sole and despotic
dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external
things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other
individual in the universe."a According to Blackstone, property is "a
right of a person with respect to something that avails against a large
and indefinite number of other persons."26
Later, however, legal realists succeeded in promoting a rival
conception, that of property as a bundle of rights. Ronald Coase went
one step further, conceiving of property as a list of particularized use
rights that individuals have when it comes to resources, i.e., in
personam rights.27 In recent decades, the "bundle of rights" view, or
in personam concept of property rights, has faced considerable
criticism, with critics arguing that this view has disintegrated the
concept of property rights, which they believe is in rem in nature and
has its own structure and style.28
The conception of property rights underlying TDRs is the bundle
of sticks rather than the in rem view. The right to develop a piece of
property is but one stick in the bundle, and the underpinning
2 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Chicago 1979), in Thomas
W. Merrill and Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111
Yale L. J. 357, 361 (2001).
26 Id. at 361.
2 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & Econ. 1 (1960).
28 J.E. Penner, The "Bundle of Rights" Picture ofProperty, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 711,711 (1996);
Merrill and Smith, 111 Yale L. J. at 361 (cited in note 25); Henry E. Smith, Property as
the Law of Things, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1691 (2012); Henry E. Smith, The Persistence of
System in Property Law, 163 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2055 (2015).
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premise of a TDR program is that this particular stick, i.e.,
"development rights," can be separated from the rest of the bundle
and sold. TDR programs use these "development rights" to facilitate
a market that directs development toward pre-selected areas and to
compensate property owners in areas selected for preservation for
the loss of the development value of their properties.29
One possible limitation to the bundle of sticks approach is that
the bundle is malleable rather than having a prefixed and coherent
structure or essence. Courts and legislatures may shape an owner's
bundle in a variety of ways, such as for regulatory or redistributive
purposes. They may also remove or curb specific sticks, and even still
the bundle will constitute property.30
The U.S. Supreme Court has embraced such malleability in
regulatory-takings cases, suggesting that because the bundle of sticks
is malleable, a regulation that deprives an owner of only one stick
does not amount to a taking that would require just compensation.3 1
In Penn Central, the Court used the "bundle of rights" theory to
isolate the development rights that the Penn Central Transportation
Company was losing from the control and use rights it still retained.32
Even in the subsequent case of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
Justice Scalia, the author of the Court's majority opinion,
acknowledged that the Court's takings law "has traditionally been
guided by the understandings of our citizens regarding the content
of, and the State's power over, the 'bundle of rights' that citizens
acquire when they obtain title to property."33
Chinese land reform has managed to both maintain and
disintegrate state and collective land ownership simultaneously by
2 Meghan Ryan, Wes Rochester, and Laura Ingram, TDR Citizens Guidebook 2 (Land
Use Clinic 2009), archived at https://perma.cc/QC65-DYFD.
30 Anna Di Robilant, Property: A Bundle of Sticks or a Tree?, 66 Vand. L. Rev. 869, 886
(2013).
31 Eric R. Claeys, The Penn Central Test and Tensions in Liberal Property Theory, 30 Harv.
Envtl. L. Rev. 339, 357 (2006).
32 Id. at 357.
505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
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discarding the in rem conception of ownership altogether. Its path
better fits the "bundle of sticks" rather than the in rem view of
property rights. 3 The two main achievements of Chinese land
reform, i.e., the establishment of land use rights (LURs) in urban
areas and the establishment of land management and contract rights
(LMCRs) in rural areas, are both examples of the stick-by-stick
approach.3 5 Understanding property as a bundle of sticks provides a
logical basis for separating urban LURs and rural LCMRs from
public land ownership, and also for rearranging the sticks to adapt
to social and economic developments.36
In the past decade, land tickets, the Chinese counterpart to TDRs,
experimented with by the local governments of Chongqing and
Chengdu serve as a more recent example of the stick-by-stick
approach to land reform in China and have already had a nationwide
impact. It is therefore important to understand the administrative
origin and incoherent nature of TDRs and their inherent connection
with takings to understand TDR practices in China. The stick-by-
stick approach to Chinese land reform, although effective, comes
with its own attendant problems, including political maneuvering in
the reform process37 and weakness in the space of individual rights.
All of these problems are exemplified in the TDR practices of
Chongqing and Chengdu.
There are different models of land reform in China that claim to
be TDRs, but this article is concerned primarily with the TDR
practices in southwestern China, Chongqing and Chengdu in
particular, primarily due to their impact on national land reform -
considering the TDR practices in Chongqing and Chengdu to be a
34 Shitong Qiao, The Evolution of Chinese Property Law: Stick by Stick?, in Yun-chien
Chang, ed., Private Law in China and Taiwan 182 (Cambridge 2015).
3 Id. at 183.
3 Id. at 189.
3 Shitong Qiao, The Politics of Chinese Land: Partial Reform, Vested Interests and Small
Property, 29 Colum. J. Asian. L. 70 (2016).
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success, the central government in 2018 authorized creating a
national market for the transfer of land use quotas across provinces.3 8
II. THE MECHANISM AND MARKET OF LAND TICKETS
The governments of both Chongqing and Chengdu have claimed
that granting farmers land tickets has enabled farmers to benefit from
the urbanization process and promoted equitable development
within their territories. 39 Therefore, the necessary questions to
investigate here are whether land tickets really constitute new rights
for farmers, how much farmers have benefitted from such practices,
and whether there is a real market for land tickets.
On paper, the governments of both cities have emphasized their
respect for farmers' willingness to generate and transact land tickets,
but transaction records reveal that farmers are neither the holder of
land tickets nor a party to the transactions at all. Examination of the
government-initiated and government-driven land reclamation
process casts serious doubt on whether farmers are voluntary
participants therein. Both the meaning and value of land tickets are
subject to manipulation, and both the sellers and purchasers of land
tickets in Chongqing and Chengdu alike have primarily been
government investment vehicles.
A. WHO GENERATES AND TRANSFERS LAND TICKETS?
On paper, the land reclamation process can be initiated only
upon an application submitted by a farmer. The governments of both
cities also require that a portion of land sufficient to meet the housing
3 Notice of the General Office of the State Council on Printing and Distributing (cited in note
12).
39 Zhang Qianqian, One of the Series of Reports on New Urbanization Construction:
Chongqing Land Ticket Reform Test, National Development and Reform Commission
(May 18, 2019), achived at https://perma.cc/5D6D-J82L [
: RPRE3@4it9tL]; Editor's Note, Great Reform in Sichuan (China Daily, Aug.
15, 2018), archived at: https://perma.cc/VA7J-JJF9 [W1fk± i$ ]
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law & Liberty
132019]
New York University Journal of Law & Liberty [Vol. 13:1
needs of the relocated farmers be retained.40 They further require the
approval of a land reclamation proposal by the majority of village
members and their upper-level governments. 41 The district and
county-level governments in both cities have established specialized
companies to carry out land reclamation.42
Provided that the district- or county-level land administration
officials are satisfied with the quality of arable land after reclamation,
a land use quota is generated.43 After removing the portion necessary
for housing and developments in the village, the local land
administration officials accumulate a certain number of such quotas
and consolidate them into a package representing a land ticket that
is ready to be traded.
The land ticket exchanges in both cities are mediated through
periodic auctions and, in theory, any natural person, legal person, or
organization is eligible to bid for the tickets. After deducting
reclamation expenses, the revenue is then distributed to farmers and
collectives as compensation. The holders of land tickets are entitled
4o Forwarded Notice of the Municipal Bureau of Land and Resources and Other Departments
on Improving the Land Transaction System to Promote the Comprehensive Improvement of
Rural Land and the Construction of Rural Houses (for trial implementation), The General
Office of the Chengdu Municipal People's Government (2010) (hereinafter Chengdu
Notice on Improving the Land Transaction System) [ A f ff rMi .
0 MI ];Notice of Further Regulation th  anag me trConstruction Land
Reclamation, Chongqing Municipal Bureau of Land and Housing (2011) [ikthrh±iM
41 Notice of Further Regulation(cited in note 40).
42 Zhang Huiqiang, The Development Path of Legal Transfer Right - - A Case Study of the
Independent Transfer of Collective Construction Land in Chengdu, Journal of Public
Administration, *119, *123 (2014) [' thW i{ f- - iMJ11ll~ l
?&$###110A0]; Cao Yapeng, The Social Process of "Quota Transfer": An Empirical Study
Based on the Chongqing Ticket System, Journal of Social Development 55 n. 2 (2014) ["4h
43 Notice of Further Regulation (cited in note 40).
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to purchase urban LURs and then use the tickets to develop the land
so bought.44
Both Chongqing and Chengdu claim that they fully respect the
choices of individual households in the foregoing process, but it is
unclear how they do so. The mechanisms adopted by the two cities
are considered in turn below.
1. Chongqing
Different levels of the Chongqing city government issue various
kinds of certificates during the land reclamation process, each like
their own property right. The first one is a certificate of construction
land reclamation qualification ( M i.k _ lit M A - iEL 45 which is
issued by the county-level government if the inspection of a
reclamation project identifies no problems.46
In the next stage of the process, the city-level land authority
conducts another inspection, after which it issues a registration
number to the aforementioned certificate of construction land
reclamation qualification (M iR E tt & & if G r ).47 Upon
receipt of this registration number, the county-level land authority
can then revoke the original land rights certificate of the reclaimed
land and register the change in status of the land use due to the land
reclamation.48 The Chongqing Land Ticket Regulations emphasize
that land rights holders do not change because of reclamation.49 In
other words, until this stage, farmers still enjoy control over their
land, at least on paper.
44 Id. at 1.
45 The Chongqing City Ticket Management Measures, Order No. 295, Art. 15 [M-It
46 Id.
47 Id. at Art. 17.
4 Id. at Art. 18.
49 The Chongqing City Ticket Management Measures, Order No. 295, Art. 19 [PlM-ti
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The next stage is the transaction stage. According to the
Chongqing Land Ticket Regulations, land ticket transactions include
the initial assignment and transfer. After receiving a registration
number from the city land authority, the rights holder can apply for
an initial assignment. Only then is the real land ticket issued, at
which point it can be further transferred.5 0
The problem is that my examination of the transaction records
on file with the Chongqing Rural Land Exchange (
P)f) identified no individual rural household as the holder of any of
the aforementioned certificates.5' The exchange publishes the results
of all land ticket transactions on its website, and I identified 84
notices of such transactions published as of June 8, 2018. Most of the
corresponding certificates covered the reclamation of rural
construction land within one or more villages.
Although the individual households concerned may have agreed
to such reclamation, there are two problems. First, it is difficult to
assemble all of the land within one or multiple villages; the process
involves administrative mobilization, rendering it similar to urban
renewal or rural land expropriation. In these situations,
expropriation agreements are the preferred mode of action, with
forceful expropriation a rarely used last resort in modem times
owing to social stability concerns and mass media coverage. 52
Second, as individual households clearly do not hold any certificates
generated through land reclamation, it is therefore difficult to say
that they have any post-reclamation property rights. Without
property rights, they cannot participate directly in the land ticket
market, and indeed, they do not participate as the transaction records
clearly indicate.
What occurs between the entity in charge of land reclamation
and individual households is thus something of a black box. I
examined the judicial decisions related to land reclamation in
' Id. at Art. 20.
51 Statistics on Chongqing Land Ticket, on file with author. [AT, Mittlg].
52 Qiaowen Lin, et al., Conflicts of Land Expropriation in China During 2006-2016: An
Overview and its Spatio-temporal Characteristics, 76 Land Use Policy 246 (2018).
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Chongqing to figure out what the process looks like on the ground.
As it turns out, a reclamation agreement is usually signed between
the village or town-level government and the farmers concerned.
When disputes over the nature of such agreements have reached the
courts, the farmers have generally argued that they are
administrative agreements just like the compensation agreements
incurred in expropriation, whereas the government has argued that
they are civil contracts between equal parties.53 As the Chongqing
government and its local regulations present the process as
voluntary, it is actually more difficult for farmers to seek judicial
remedy through administrative litigation than it would be in the case
of outright land expropriation.54
2. Chengdu
The Chengdu city government emphasizes that "rural collectives
and households owning land rights decide by themselves important
issues such as whether to participate, how to finance, how to build
houses, how to allocate benefits, and how to adjust property rights."
55 On paper, rural collectives and households can determine the
ownership of the land use quotas generated through land
reclamation: if these entities conduct the reclamation themselves,
5 Wu Mingcheng v. People's Government of Tanghe Town in Jiangjin District, Chongqing
City and Chongqing Municipal Bureau of Land Resources and Bureau of Housing
Management, Chongqing 5th Intermediate People's Ct. (2015) (Appeal to Affirm the
Administrative Judgment) [YS4- i E #rKA mR Rffl
AM ±WIh A 9 J 14]; Lian Fenghua v. Bureau of Land Resources and
Housing Management of Chongqing Tongliang District Government, Chongqing Tongliang
District Land Reclamation Center and Chongqing Tongliang District Shaoyun Town People's
Government, Tongliang District Civil Ct. (2015) (Homestead Use Rights Dispute Case)
People's Government of Ciyun Town, Jiangjin District, Chongqing City v. Tan Keyu,
Chongqing 5th Intermediate People's Ct. (2015) (Appellate Civil Court Judgment) [A
5 Chengdu Notice on Improving the Land Transaction System (cited in note 40).
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then they own the quotas; if they authorize investors and
governmental reclamation agencies to do so, then they can decide on
quota ownership by contract.56 In practice, however, I was unable to
find a single case of an individual household or village holding a land
use quota under its own name.
I examined all 253 land use quota transactions published by the
Chengdu Rural Property Rights Exchange (
and found that: (1) in 147 of the transactions, the Chengdu Land
Reserve Center ($Bi #(1@ p) had acted as the transferor;5 7 (2)
corporate entities accounted for another 98 transactions; (3) the
Chongzhou Land Reserve Center ( ±'JI#| 2 P(T L) accounted for
four; and (4) local governments had acted as the transferor in the
remaining four transactions. No rural collective or household acted
as the transferor in any of the transactions, which indicates that rural
collectives and households do not hold outright ownership of the
land use quotas generated from rural land reclamation. The real
question is how local governments and their affiliated land reserve
centers obtained those quotas from the farmers in the first instance.
In reality, they do so through a process of centralized
expropriation. A county-level government often makes a plan to
generate a certain number of land use quotas in its jurisdiction, which
are then further divided into projects located in different towns
within the county. Take the Chengdu county of Qionglai as an
example. Qionglai has planned 11 rural land reclamation projects
and created three centralized living areas for relocated farmers.
These three areas occupy 2,106 mu (347 acres) of land, with 920,000
square meters of housing space for 21,600 farmers, all of whose
original residential plots were reclaimed. The government thus
-s Implementation Suggestions on Perfecting Construction Land Quota Transaction
Institutions and Promoting Rural Land Synthetical Arrangements by Bureau of Land
Resources of Chengdu City, Bureau of Land Resources of Chengdu City (2011) [hl@1il
5 These land use quotas represent 66 percent of the total area of all the quota
transacted.
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claimed that this remote county in Chengdu has achieved an
urbanization rate of 85 percent. 58 It further claimed that it had
achieved this remarkable figure by leading a team headed by the
county party secretary. At the village level, the team set up a
villagers' assembly to discuss compensation standards and other
relocation measures.59 Although there was no forceful demolition, it
is hard to believe that in the face of such top-down mobilization and
community pressure the farmers concerned had any real possibility
of saying "no." An interviewee in Chengdu revealed that the local
government often sets a deadline by which all households within a
given project area need to be relocated.60 The requisite signatures are
obtained from farmers in one way or another, or simply forged.61
As in Chongqing, when individual farmers in Chengdu seek
remedy from the local courts, they find them unhelpful for two
reasons. First, a court cannot review the legality of local government
reclamation plans, which, according to Chinese law, are abstract
administrative actions that are exempt from litigation.62 Second, for
specific operations, precisely because the government implemented
its plans through a villagers' assembly, the local courts have
considered the matter to be an autonomous village affair, and such
affairs are also exempt from litigation."
57 Qionglai Land Reclamation Plan 2016-2020, Qionglai City Government (Dec. 2018) [31
9*M A K9M, ), 4d*-r4r± ihlM't] (2016-2020 !)].
5Id.
59NSD Interview Notes, Xinping Township, Xinjin County (Jan. 14, 2009) (on file with
the author).
61 Long Peigang v. Shizhu County Bureau of Land Resources and Housing Administration
and Others, Chongqing City 4th Intermediate Ct. (2016) (Second Instance Civil
Judgment of Property Rights Disputes) [" 7Fgfi l
62 Yu Xiong v. People's Government of Qionglai City, Sichuan Province High Ct. (2015)
(Administrative Case) [n#if hWWA RI Mh J.
63 Yu Xiong v. Villager's Committee of Zhuanwiao Village, Daozuo Country, Qionglai City
and Others, Sichuan Province High Ct. (2017) (Confirming Void Contract Dispute)
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B. THE MALLEABLE MARKET
The city governments in both cities dominate the transfer of land
tickets through their investment vehicles and by manipulating the
meaning and content of those tickets. The land ticket markets in the
two cities barely function as evidenced by the near non-existence of
a secondary market, with prices holding steady across transactions
and over time despite rapidly rising land prices.
1. The Malleable Meaning and Content of Land Tickets
The city governments in Chengdu and Chongqing have clearly
manipulated the meaning and content of land tickets to influence
their prices and transactions.
What are land tickets for? The first possibility is to serve as a
market entry permit. In China, urban land is owned by the state,
while individuals and private entities can own LURs and houses.
City governments monopolize the primary market of LURs and sell
those rights through public auctions. The Chengdu city government
initially made land tickets as permits to participate in LUR auctions.
The second possibility is to serve as land use permits. Hence
developers do not need land tickets to purchase LURs, but they do
need them to exercise those rights, i.e., to build on the land in
question.
Under the first policy, developers were uncertain about the
supply of land tickets and worried that they would lose their chance
to participate in the city's real estate market. As a result, the first
auction of land tickets in December 2010 ended up with an average
price of RMB 724,900 per mu, a high price that would significantly
increase the cost of real estate development in Chengdu.
Accordingly, the Ministry of Land and Resources ("MLR") read the
situation as potentially creating a real estate bubble and intervened.
The Chengdu government then shifted to the second policy,
requiring developers to provide land tickets only to exercise their
LURs.
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This change in policy reduced the average price to RMB180,000
per mu in 2011,64 and the price has hovered around RMB300,000 per
mu since 2015. 65 However, these prices are decided by the
government according to the cost of land reclamation rather than
being driven by market supply and demand.
In Chongqing, the government manipulated the size of the land
ticket package to influence prices. To limit price and market
competition, most land tickets cover areas larger than 1000 mu (164.7
acres), and are purchased by the investment vehicles of the
Chongqing city government. The large size of land tickets renders
them unaffordable and unsuitable for other market participants.66
2. Market Participants and Prices
Public transaction records show only the size and area of the
rural land being reclaimed, not the sellers. As discussed previously,
individual households and village collectives rarely hold rights to the
certificates generated in the land reclamation process, most of which
are held instead by land reclamation companies, which are
government investment vehicles in the main. We can thus assume
that they are the sellers.
For the purchasers of land tickets in Chengdu, we have
meaningful data. As of June 5, 2018, there had been a total of 253
transactions in Chengdu city,67 with the transferee a corporate entity
in every case. Of the 17 major corporate entities involved, 11 are
specialized real estate development companies. The top transferee,
64 Zhang Ming, Chengdu Land Ticket "Access" Changed to "Appropriate Use" (China
Business Journal, July 22, 2011), archived at https://perma.cc/F8VU-R42N [)AffitAA
65 Announcement on Transactions of Construction Land Quotas, Chengdu Agriculture
Equity Exchange (Jun. 5, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/X7EG-UUUW [itiffl
66 Pu Jie, Several Theoretical Issues on Cross-Provincial Trading of Cultivated Land
Occupation and Compensation Index, Theory and Reform 1, 8 (2017) [WA5*+ rik 'F
67 Announcement on Transactions of Construction Land Quotas (cited in note 65).
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Chengdu Ren Ju, is a state-owned corporation that focuses on real
estate development and capital market operations.68
Three characteristics of the Chongqing market are notable. First,
there are very few secondary transactions. Ninety-nine percent of all
transactions are initial assignments, showing a lack of real market
demand.
Second, since early 2014, all initial assignments have been
achieved at the listed price instead of by auction. According to the
transaction rules, only when both of two requirements are satisfied
will there be an auction: (1) there are two or more purchasers, and (2)
the total area these purchasers want to purchase is larger than the
supply in the notice.69 This means that since early 2014 there has been
little market competition, with only one purchaser applying for land
tickets less than or equal to the supply.
Third, the minor fluctuation in land ticket prices does not match
the rapidly increasing land prices in Chongqing during the same
period. Prices remained nearly the same across different transactions
from 2012 to 2017.70
III. LAND RECLAMATION AS ANOTHER NAME FOR
EXPROPRIATION
Land reclamation can constitute land expropriation in the
following situations. First, when it occurs without farmers' consent.
Reclamation in such cases is direct expropriation because the
government is exercising coercive power to deprive farmers of their
land rights. Second, when land reclamation generates land tickets,
which enables the government o expropriate land beyond what the
top-down land use control system allows. Third, when the
government and village collectives serve as the intermediary and
6 About Habitat, Chengdu Xingcheng Habitat Real Estate Investment Group Co., Ltd.
(Jun. 5, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/3ZKW-R7TQ.
69 See e.g., Announcement on Land Tickets Public Transaction in Chongqing Land Exchange,
Chongqing Agriculture Equity Exchange, No. 1 (2018), archived at
https://perma.cc/L6CH-NH8K [ 'iA f)].
70 Announcement on Transactions of Construction Land Quotas (cited in note 65).
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exercise de facto control over the land reclamation process and the
trading of land tickets, with farmers themselves having no control
over either, even though they may have given their consent. In this
last situation, not only does their nominal consent not prevent
farmers from being exploited by the government and village
collectives, it actually becomes a barrier when seeking remedy
through administrative litigation, as documented above.
A. LAND RECLAMATION WITHOUT CONSENT
The local regulations of both Chongqing and Chengdu
emphasize that reclamation must be voluntary.7 1 However, judicial
decisions from both jurisdictions reveal cases in which houses were
demolished and residential plots reclaimed without the knowledge
or consent of the rights-holders. Such involuntary reclamation in the
cases examined occurred in situations where the rights-holder did
not reside in the disputed house, because, for example, (1) they had
relocated elsewhere; (2) they were working in a city as a migrant
worker and had not been notified when their house was being
demolished; or (3) they shared the house with another party because
of an inheritance or some other similar transaction.72
In Chen Zuoliang, the plaintiff had relocated to a different village
but still had a house in his original village. Although he had legal
certificates to prove his property rights, the township government
still demolished his house and reclaimed the land under the
71 Urban and Rural Construction Land Increase and Decrease, Art. 16, National Ministry of
Land and Resources [ 1) & i J A 4± J iA W #) 8 ]; The Chongqing City
Ticket Management Measures, Order No. 295, Arts. 2, 3, 9 (cited in note 45);
Implementation Opinions of Chengdu Municipal Bureau of Land and Resources on Improving
the Construction of Land Use Index Trading System to Promote Comprehensive Improvement
of Rural Land, Chengdu Bureau of Land and Resources [AN-fi fI115f VM.
n Fan Anhe v. People's Government of Ganshui Town, Qijiang District, Chongqing and
Others, Chongqing Qijiang District People's Ct. (2016) [X - il
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impression that the house had been abandoned. 73 The court
confirmed the illegality of the demolition. In Ma Renji, the plaintiff
worked in a city as a migrant worker and only discovered that his
house had been demolished after returning home. It turned out that
he shared the house with his brother Ma Rende, who had applied for
land reclamation. The township government approved Ma Rende's
application without further investigation of the property rights
pertaining to the house.74
In another case, the Yongchuan district government land bureau
relied on an application from a township government o reclaim the
land of a rural household that had not signed a reclamation
agreement.75 The same government agency lost another case in the
same court for reclaiming another villager's house without consent,
with the court confirming the illegality of the demolition.76
Overall, reclamation without consent is the exception rather than
the rule, but it has occurred in at least the aforementioned cases, if
not in others. Because rural land reclamation is initiated and driven
by local governments which need to assemble land within one or
multiple villages into a single land reclamation project, finding a way
to ensure that land reclamation does not become another name for
land expropriation is no easy task.
73 Chen Zuoliang v. People's Government ofYongxin Town, Qijiang District, Chongqing City,
Chongqing Nan'an District Ct. (2015) [Xi' ft -kff $#f MAAR V].
74 Ma Renji v. People's Government of Panlong Town, Rongchang District, Chongqing and
Others, Rongchang District Ct. (2016) (Administrative Judgment of First Instance
Requiring Confirmation ofIllegal Demolition) [X'5ik1ff tiWA ROU9ff
5 ia Yingming v. Yongchuan District Bureau of Land Resources and Housing, Chongqing
City and Others, Yongchuan District Court (2015) (Administrative First Instance
Judgment)[M&i I I-,R YA 9:KI I:
; Jia Yingyong v. Yongchuan District Bureau of Land Resources and Housing, Chongqing
City, Yongchuan District Court (2015) (Administrative First Instance Judgment) [MR
76 Huang Fayou v. Yongchuan District Bureau of Land Resources and Housing, Chongqing
City, Yongchuan District Court (2015) (Administrative First Instance Judgment) [AK
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The Chongqing courts at various levels have confirmed the
illegality of land reclamation without consent. Although such
judicial confirmation may strengthen farmers' claims for
compensation, it does not give them their land back. As one
judgement stated, the land reclamation project had now been
completed, and the decision was therefore irrevocable. 7
Furthermore, the condition of consent is also taken to be satisfied if
rights-holder accepts compensation after reclamation even if they
had not provided explicit consent either before or after it took place.78
I
B. EXPANDED SCOPE OF LANiD EXPROPRIATION
It is not only that land reclamation can become another name for
land expropriation for the parcel which the land use quota is
generated, i.e., the sending zone. Land tickets also expand local
governments' land expropriation power in the two following
respects. First, local governments are able to expropriate more land
using the additional land use quotas generated by land reclamation.
Second, the local governments may need to expropriate additional
land in order to relocate farmers from the sending zones.
The first expansion of land expropriation is intuitive, and is
inherent in the institutional design of land tickets. In one case, land
tickets also become a way for a local government o legalize its illegal
land expropriation. In this case, the Qijiang district government of
Chongqing expropriated 250 mu of rural land to build a factory
without obtaining approval from the upper-level government. This
7 Cheng Mingli v. Zhong County Bureau of Land Resources and Housing, Chongqing
Zhong County People's Ct. (2017) [% HJ, 993NW2W 4VT M-].
78 Yin Jiancheng v. Kaizhou District Bureau of Land Resources and Housing, Chongqing City,
Kaizhou District Ct. (2016) (Administrative First Trial 0234 No.93) [FRAM PA_ VT-
+i L ##DA3 HA]; Jiang Zhaowu v. People's Government of Jiulongshan Town,
Kai County, Chongqing City 2nd Intermediate Ct. (2014) (Administrative Final Decision
No. 00011) [ YL REA-LLMk f]; Jiang Moumou v. People's Government of
Jiulongshan Town, Kai County, Kai District Ct. (2013) (Administrative First Trial
No.00037) [ l1.
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illegal expropriation was eventually publicized by the MLR and
circulated by People's Network as a "significant illegal land use
case."79 However, the Chongqing city government land bureau only
asked the Qijiang district government to use land tickets from a
previous land reclamation to legalize the current expropriation.8 0 It
is evident from this case that it is simpler to expropriate land using
land tickets than to gain the approval of an upper-level government.
The second expansion, that accommodates the local
governments' need for additional land to relocate farmers from
sending zones, arises because those governments have'no incentive
to spend the land use quotas generated through land reclamation.
Instead, they may sign agreements with other villages to use their
land to build new housing for farmers from a sending zone. By
forcing an agreement with a village, the government can disguise the
expropriative nature of its actions.
In one case in Chengdu, a township government signed an
agreement for "the transfer of [a] rural land contract and
management rights" with the intention of using the 143 mu of rural
land in question to construct housing for relocated farmers. The
village collective lost arable land preservation funding because of
this contract/expropriation and sued the township government. The
village collective alleged that the land reclamation had been illegal
land expropriation, whereas the township government contended
that it was not expropriation because there was a contract. In reality,
however, both the process and procedure were similar to land
7 Renmin Wang, The Ministry of Land and Resources Reported 8 Investigation of Land
Violation Cases, People's Network (2018), archived at https://perma.cc/H7VG-
WHQH [ F9 1- 1 X . A 8 :1:t Z 3_t*f M].
8 See e.g., Wang Fuqiang v. Chongqing City Bureau of Land Resources and Housing
Management, Chongqing City 5th Intermediate Ct. (2017) [111i11: ]
)AJ RW KM V]; Liu Mingqi v. Chongqing City Bureau of Land Resources and Housing
Management, Chongqing City 5th Intermediate Ct. (2017) [
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expropriation. It was even called "expropriation" in internal local
government documents. 81
The courts in Chengdu have consistently avoided deciding these
cases on the merits of the government action in question. The Jintang
Basic Court, for example, rejected a case on the basis of the statute of
limitations, and the Sichuan High Court rejected a claim on the
grounds that the 85 plaintiffs lacked the right to sue the district
government in the first instance, as the government itself had not
signed the contract or implemented the expropriation in question.82
What is wrong with an expansion of land expropriation? It is
entirely possible that local governments really do need more land for
development. However, as previously discussed, the Chinese central
government has created a top-down system to regulate the land
expropriation power of local governments. Hence, land
expropriation disguised as land reclamation can easily spiral out of
control because it is not called expropriation, and farmers' consent is
thus often assumed. For example, a government could argue that
because a certain instance of reclamation was not expropriation, it is
not subject to the public hearing and transparency requirements of
land expropriation. In at least two judicial decisions issued by the
courts in Chengdu, the government justified its refusal to provide
land reclamation information on the grounds that no expropriation
had taken place and that the reclamation had been consented by the
farmers, even though in the cases in question it was precisely the
farmers whose land had been reclaimed who were requesting the
information.83
1 He Mei & Others v. People's Government of Qingbaijiang District, Chongqing, Chongqing
People's High Court (2017) (Administrative Final Decision) [#hJ- A. W n M UX A
82 The 10th Group in Dongfang Village, Xiangfu County, Qingbaijiang District v. Xiangfu
County People's Government, Jintang Basic Court (2016) [-W n AM 10 41Rw
QMAKW,]; He Mei & Others (cited in note 81).
83 Deng Renlin & Deng Renly v. People's Government of Danjingshan Town, Pengzhou City,
Chengdu Qingbaijiang District Ct. (2017) (Administrative First Trial Judgment) [>i$f
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C. LAND RECLAMATION WITH CONSENT, BUT WITH NON-
NEGOTIABLE PRICE, QUANTITY AND PAYMENT
Farmers cannot sell land; they can only give it up for reclamation.
Although land reclamation requires farmers' consent, it imposes
non-negotiable compensation standards, which can be even lower
than the compensation standards in the cases of expropriation for
two reasons: (1) regulations often define only subsets of the
reclaimed land as requiring compensation, even though the farmers
are losing control over all of the land, and (2) the payment process is
itself controlled by the government and often lasts a year or longer.
1. Uniform Compensation I stead of Negotiable Price
Because land tickets are not inherently connected with a
particular plot of land and are sold at a uniform price on the market,
land reclamation compensation does not differentiate among
villagers with differing qualities of houses and those located in
different parts of Chongqing or Chengdu.
In Chongqing, compensation for land reclamation is supposed to
be comparable to that for land expropriation. 8 However, detailed
examination reveals that it is often less in practice. For example, in
2017, the price for a land ticket in Chongqing was RMB 279 per
square meter. According to Chongqing city policy, that money
should be allocated between the village collective and farmers at a
ratio of 15:85. 8 Assuming that not a single penny is withheld
4, At t LA JiI]; Liao Chengyu v.
People's Government of Danjingshan Town, Pengzhou City, Chengdu Qingbaijiang
District Ct. (2017) (Administrative First Trial Judgment) [JVM25009tillif}AdiMA
8 Noticefor the Issuance of Guiding Opinions on Regulating the Use of Land Ticket Fees to
Promote the Reclamation of Rural Collective Construction Land (Trial), No. 384, Chongqing
Municipal Bureau of Land Resources and Housing Management (2010) [iP~flJ ((A
8 Notice of Chongqing City Bureau of Land Resources and Housing Management on
Adjusting the Distribution and Disbursement Standards of Land Ticket Fees, Chongqing
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somewhere in the bureaucratic system and that the administrative
cost is zero, farmers should get RMB 237 (USD 34.2) per square meter.
However, even in remote districts of Chongqing, the compensation
standard in the case of expropriation is more than RMB 260 per
square meter for houses with clay walls and tiles.86 Only for a simple
shed or shack would the compensation be less than RMB 200 per
square meter.87 Hence, only in the latter case would land reclamation
actually bring a farmer more compensation than land expropriation.
Villagers surveyed during fieldwork studies by faculty members
and students from the National School of Development in 2009
complained that the compensation for rural land reclamation was
even lower than that typically paid in rural land expropriation
cases.88 The government's response was that the reclaimed land still
belonged to the rural collectives, and therefore no compensation for
the land was warranted.89
The result, as local officials confirmed, is that compensation
received for land reclamation is usually insufficient to cover the cost
of new housing." The experience of one such villager, Mr. Wang, is
a case in point. He had a residential plot of 290 square meters, for
which he received compensation of roughly RMB50,000, including
RMB40,000 in housing compensation and RMB10,000 in
compensation for the loss of his crops. As Mr. Wang no longer had a
house, he needed to buy an apartment, which cost RMB54,000, and
City Bureau of Land Resources and Housing Management, No. 170 (2011), archived at
https://pena.cc/B2M3-7UX2 [1±tffiRifA i'9
86 See, e.g., Notice of Fengdu County on Adjustment of Compensation Policy for Land
Expropriation, Fengdu County (2013) [i@EAL tiIi - $ 1
8 Id.
88 NSD Interview Notes, Xinping Township, Xinjin County (Jan. 14, 2009) (on file with
the author) (cited in note 59).
89 Id.
9 Id.
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decorating it cost an additional RMB10,000.9 Not only did Mr. Wang
not gain any extra cash from the compensation, he was substantially
out of pocket as a result of his relocation.92
2. Eligible Reclamation Area Prone to Manipulation
A frequent issue of litigation in the Chongqing courts is the area
of land eligible for compensation. A major area of dispute is whether
a courtyard and other areas and facilities surrounding a house are
eligible for compensation. The area specified on land tickets actually
includes such surrounding areas and facilities, which are usually
bigger than the area of the house itself, -but in practice, village
collectives often insist that it is only the house that is being reclaimed,
with the vacant land around it constituting a collective asset.9
Moreover, because the law specifies that only real estate with a
legal certificate can be reclaimed,94 and as the vacant land around a
house has no such certificate even if it has been under the de facto
control of the house owner for an extended time, village collectives
often refuse to compensate householders for that land, thereby
depriving farmers of a large part of the compensation paid out for
land reclamation.
In the most egregious cases, village collectives simply make
deliberate "mistakes" in reporting the area for compensation, with
91 Id.
9 NSD Interview Notes, Xinping Township, Xinjin County (Jan. 14, 2009) (on file with
the author) (cited in note 59).
9 See, e.g., Wu Dejian v. People's Government of Shimen Country, Yunyang County and
Yunyang County Bureau of Land Resources and Housing Management, Yunyang County
Ct. (2015) (Administrative First Trial Judgment) [_Yzi4ji) U QTTiJ E l ,
9 Chongqing City Rural Construction Land Reclamation Project Management Regulations
(Trial), Art. 2, Chongqing City Bureau of Land Resources and Housing Management
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only the most tenacious villagers being able to successfully obtain
justice through petitions or the courts.95
3. Administrative Compensation Instead of Market Payment
All of the revenue obtained from selling land tickets, after the
deduction of administrative and reclamation costs, is supposed to be
paid to village collectives and individual farmers at a ratio of 15: 85
percent. However, the costs to be deducted are out of the farmers'
control, and they often have to wait a year or longer before receiving
full compensation. In such cases, the government can simply say that
the land ticket transaction has not yet taken place. It is difficult to
determine why one land ticket is considered to be sold while another
is not, even though there is no difference between the two.
D. A CAVEAT
None of this is to deny that farmers in rural Chongqing actually
welcome land reclamation in some cases. A review of Chongqing
court decisions actually turns up cases of farmers suing the
government for not approving a reclamation application. 96 A survey
conducted in Zhuoshui, a remote township in the Qianjiang district
of Chongqing, collected responses of 181 farmers, 34 of whom had
their land reclaimed. More than half of these farmers said they were
either neutral or satisfied with the land reclamation.
That should not come as a surprise. Reclamation is the one of
only two ways of "cashing out" vacant housing in remote
Chongqing, as there is no lawful market for rural houses and the
illegal market is not well developed. The other way is direct
expropriation, which is also welcomed by farmers in many cases.
9 Tian Huailin v. Xiushan Tujia and Miao Autonomous County Bureau of Land Resources
and Housing Management, Chongqing City 4th Intermediate Ct. (2016) [E'iff 1
9 See, e.g., Deng Pingyun v. People's Government of Pushun Town, Dianjiang County,
Chongqing City 3rd Intermediate Ct. (2016) [Y5 i#I 1 l Liu
Xianguo v. People's Government of Pushun Town, Dianjiang County, Chongqing City 3rd
Intermediate Ct. (2016) [Z if&li li
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This survey also asked the respondents about their
understanding of land reclamation, specifically whether they
considered it to be different from land expropriation. The majority
answered "no," testifying to my argument that land tickets are but
another name for expropriation.
IV. WHY? RURAL WELFARE AND RIGHTS IN THE CENTRAL-LOCAL
DYNAMICS
It is important to put land tickets in context to understand their
evolution. China has dual land ownership, and local. governments,
which enjoy state land ownership, are permitted to expropriate
collectively owned rural land and convert it into state-owned urban
land. Local governments rely on revenue from land sales and on
subsidized land for economic development and urbanization.
However, this model has served to displace millions of farmers,
triggering hundreds of thousands of mass protests and conflicts each
year. In the past two decades, the central government has gradually
strengthened the regulations on the xpropriation and conversion
process owing to concerns over ural instability, which has resulted
in a rights revolution in national law and politics concerning rural
land. Accordingly, it has become much more difficult for local
governments to exercise their expropriation power. However, they
still need land and revenue for economic development. By framing
land ticket practices as protecting the rights and welfare of farmers,
local governments have succeeded in gaining the central
government's acquiesce and even approval for those practices, even
though they are all just expropriation by another name.
A. THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION IN NATIONAL LAW AND
POLITICS OF LAND
Article 10 of the Chinese Constitution provides that urban land
is owned by the state and rural land by collectives. However, the
boundary between urban and rural land is not static, as city and
county governments can expropriate the latter and convert it into the
former.
Three considerations drive the politics of the Chinese land
regime: development, stability and the food supply. Local
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governments are the key drivers of urbanization and
industrialization, and they rely on their power to expropriate rural
land from farmers and either assign it to industrial investors as a
subsidy or sell it to real estate developers to finance urban
infrastructure and other facilities. The central government
understands the importance of land to local economic development,
which is one of the reasons that it has granted local governments the
power to manage land. From 2003 to 2012, cities across the country
expropriated 37,400 square kilometers of rural land at an average
price of RMB 30,000 to 40,000 per mu, which was calculated according
to the agricultural value of the land.97 The total revenue realized from
selling that land on the urban market was RMB 15.2 trillion, a sum
that has supported China's rapid urbanization.98
Owing to rural land expropriation being a key contributor of
Chinese urbanization and economic development over the past three
decades, there has been a rise in the number of landless farmers.
According to an official estimate, there will be more than 100 million
landless farmers by 2030. 9 Land expropriation often worsens
farmers' lives, and land-related conflicts are now the top grievance
filed in rural China.100
This brings us to the second and third concerns in the politics of
land: rural stability and food self-sufficiency. Both are contrary to the
transfer and development of rural land. China is a unitary regime in
which local governments are agents of the central government and
9 Zheng Zhenyuan, New Urbanization and China's Land Reform, Lecture (Apr. 23, 2013)
(on file with the author) [ ) EliMJtl-k)].
9 Id.
9 Gu Ruizhen et al., To Realize the Saving and Optimization of Land Usage: Who was
Affected by the Red Line of 1.8 Billion mu arable land? (Xinhua, July 7, 2007), archived at
https://perma.cc/7UK9-MGHM. [(Si) ) 1.8 1llifh "iI A"
100 According to a report of the People's Daily, land expropriations have become the
most frequent subject of petitions made by Chinese farmers. Land Expropriation: Top
Reason for Chinese Farmers' Petitions (People's Daily, Jan. 30, 2007), archived at
https://perma.cc/ZPM5-TR9C.
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should thus share its concerns. However, owing to their differing
incentives, local governments tend to overemphasize development
at the expense of stability and food self-sufficiency, both of which are
national public goods. Economic development can be measured by
the annual GDP growth rate and is thus visible, and there is a direct
connection between land development and economic development.
However, the risk of social instability or inability to supply food to
the citizenry during a crisis is a problem at the national level-"a
common pool that will be overfished by competing local leaders."or
The central government has incorporated social stability as a key
criterion for evaluating local government officials, but those officials
have tended to devote resources to "maintaining social stability" by
cracking down on organized resistance rather than reducing land
expropriation, as doing so would jeopardize its goal of economic
development.
In the past two decades, the central government has regulated
local governments' land expropriation power in two ways. The first
is by controlling the total amount of rural land expropriation, with
the central government setting the amount to be developed during
fixed periods of time across the country.102 Local (province, city,
county, and township) governments then make land use plans for
their jurisdictions in accordance with the national plan and the plans
of higher-level governments, subject to the approval of the central
government and/or province-level government. 103 According to
these land use plans, the various levels of government have certain
land use quotas determining how much rural land they can
expropriate each year.
The second way is strengthening the protection of rural land
rights. With real estate expropriation having become the top cause of
101 Jonathan Rodden and Susan Rose-Ackerman, Does Federalism Preserve Markets?, 83
Va. L. Rev. 1521, 1544 (1997).
102 National Principles of Land Use Planning (2006-2020), State Council (2008) [ & l11f
JJ (2006-2020 *)].
103 Land Administration Law of the People's Republic, Standing Commission of the
National People's Congress, Art. 21 (1998) [E$A±TOU~flf].
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social instability in China, the central government has passed a series
of laws aimed at disciplining local governments, beginning with a
2004 constitutional amendment, stipulating that "[c]itizens' lawful
private property is inviolable." The Chinese legislature also passed
the Property Law in 2007 to provide comprehensive protection for
property rights. Article 4 of the 2007 Property Law stipulates that
"the property right of the state, the collectives, the individual persons
and other obligees are protected by law, and no units or individuals
shall encroach on it." The central government has also reformed the
land expropriation regime04 and judicial system05 to contain local
governments' expropriation power. Moreover, social stability has
also become more important in evaluating local officials, making
them more cautious about expropriating rural land in a way that may
trigger social conflicts.
Overall, the traditional method of rural land expropriation is
facing increasingly stringent regulations. Rural welfare and rights
have become the central government's major concern when
considering any proposal for rural land reform. Local governments
have therefore been pressed to find an alternative way to obtain land
from farmers to maintain their desired levels of economic
development.
B. LAND TICKETS REFRAMED AS RIGHTS AND WELFARE
FOR FARMERS
Central-local politics drove the launch of land tickets in
Chongqing and Chengdu. In Chongqing, it was Bo Xilai, a prominent
political figure and candidate for a position in the Standing
Committee of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China
("CCP"), who made land tickets one of his signature "common
0 Regulations for the Implementation of the Land Management Law of the People's Republic
of China, State Council (2014) [
105 Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues Concerning the Trial of
Administrative Cases Concerning Rural Collective Land, Supreme People's Court (2011)
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wealth" (# Ml J'lV) policies, which were supposed to promote both
development and equality. 106 Owing to his substantial political
resources and influences, Bo was able to gain the acquiescence of the
central government by reframing land tickets as a means of
advancing rural social welfare and rights, thereby addressing the
central government's concern with rural welfare. In Chengdu, it was
the urgent demand for disaster relief after the Sichuan Earthquake
that forced the MLR to relax land use regulations and allow land
ticket practices. In both cities, local government evasion of national
land use regulations existed before the birth of land tickets, and
initially faced regulatory barriers and even enforcement obstacles by
central government agencies. Only after reframing these illegal
practices as a form of rural welfare and rights protection and
rebranding them as land tickets, thereby addressing the central
government's concern over social instability, did the two cities obtain
support from the central government.107
1. Rural Welfare and Rights as Political Capital: Land Tickets as Bo
Xilai's Poster Child
While Bo Xilai was in charge of Chongqing, one of China's four
provincial-level cities, he took land use quota transfers, which were
already being practiced among local governments in Zhejiang
province, 108 to the next level, branding them as a means of
empowering farmers, which, together with the anticorruption
measures he implemented, was part of his populist ideology.
Bo took up the position of party secretary of Chongqing in 2007
as part of his widely acknowledged ambition to obtain a seat on the
106 See, e.g., Frangois Godement, One or Two Chinese Models? (European Council on
Foreign Relations, Nov. 2011), archived at https://perma.cc/Q7T4-X9ZQ.
107 Reform's Big Taboo (cited in note 4).
108 Wang Hui and Tao Ran, The Zhejiang Model of TDRs, in Case Studies in China's
Institutional Change, 138-66 (China Financial and Economic Publishing House 1999)
A~A ), i fRVW]-53 9M f).9X(3KR)) PR$l t ±M mfi5
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Standing Committee of the CCP Politburo within five years. To
realize that ambition, he needed to perform well as party secretary,
and, as previously noted, the key to economic development in
Chinese cities has traditionally been land development. Chongqing
was no exception.
Immediately after taking office, Bo made rural land reform his
priority. The city initially tried out a practice called land shares,
converting farmers' land rights into shares and making the latter
transferrable. However, the central government sent a team to
Chongqing to investigate, and quickly put a stop to the experiment
out of concerns over farmers losing their land.109
Bo was one of the country's most powerful local leaders at the
time, with considerable political capital and support to govern
Chongqing. Just before he took office as the city's party secretary, the
central government had designated Chongqing and Chengdu as
comprehensive experimental zones for urban-rural integrated
development,11 0 a designation that afforded the two cities greater
flexibility in policy experimentation and innovation than other cities.
Nevertheless, to conduct rural land reform, Bo still needed to cater
for the central government's concerns over rural welfare and
stability, meaning that farmers' interests had to be protected.
In response to those concerns, Bo and the Chongqing city
government developed the system of land tickets, which they touted
as a way of transferring wealth from urban to rural areas and of
enriching farmers and converting them into urban citizens with
genuine capital. The idea sounded plausible: farmers would generate
land tickets through rural land reclamation and transfer them to
'0 Yin Hongwei, Chongqing's "Land Transfer" Reform Faced Fluctuation and the Reform of
the Land Securisation System was Stopped by the Central Government (People Online, Nov.
10, 2008), archived at https://perma.cc/GL6R-6BUF [(9f)$Ah) W.Ek"ithMW"MAWi@
110 Zhang Qin et al., Why the Urban and Rural Comprehensive Reform Pilot Zone has Taken
Place in Chengdu and Chongqing (Xinhua, June 14, 2007), archived at
https://perma.cc/4GZ9-DTHU [(4k*) 9,VJWW#*--lt itid 41KM #IEbAAK].
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developers who needed them for urban land development. "'
Farmers could even keep the arable land generated through rural
land reclamation and earn money by selling land tickets.
Accordingly, the central government approved the establishment of
the Chongqing Land Ticket Exchange, allowing rural land
reclamation and the transfer of land tickets citywide.112
Although Bo failed in his quest for membership of the Politburo
Standing Committee and is now in prison for corruption and
murder,"' similar schemes of TDRs have been implemented by local
governments in more than 20 provinces across China. 114 Huang
Qifan, the former mayor of Chongqing and the primary designer of
the land ticket experiment, has hailed the Chongqing Land Ticket
Exchange as a success,"15 and leading Chinese economists have also
applauded it.116 The Chongqing experiment also served as the basis
for the nationwide transfer of land use quotas authorized by the
"I Huang Qifan, Experiment and Effect of the Ticket System - - Thoughts on the Innovation
of Chongqing Land Transaction System (Study Times, May 4, 2015), archived at
https://perma.cc/4M4T-R4NP [(_ii^J`.) J - ' -- f E wMiji
112 Several Opinions of the State Council on Promoting Chongqing's Urban and Rural Reform
and Development, State Council (2009), archived at https://perma.cc/5MAT-V8BE [M
u1 See, e.g., Kathrin Hille, Bo Xilai Trial Exposes the Man and His Rivals (Financial Times,
Aug. 26, 2013), available online at https://www.ft.com/content/6dl83392-OeOd-11e3-
bfc8-00144feabdcO (visited on Sep. 21, 2019) (Perma archive unavailable).
14 Zhou Qiren, The Road Map for Land Market Development, (Economic Observer Online,
Aug. 20, 2014), archived at https://perma.cc/G3LV-ZLL2 [(}?47) A:iA~Aif)1lr
115 Huang Qifan, Innovation of Chongqing Land Transaction System (cited in note 111).
116 See, e.g., Zhou Qiren, Return Rights and Empower: Laying a Solid Foundation for Long-
term Development (Economic Observer, July 2, 2009), archived at
https://perma.cc/ZXK8-LQ3Q [(M$J:f) ijg : ;T-)?JNfgegjg-i (if
'] Jia Kang, The Chongqing Land Ticket System Under Land Quota Balance Is Worthy
Of Recognition (21st Century Business Herald, Oct. 14, 2016), archived at
https://perma.cc/PS2R-HR8E [()Ibt) M17 li$ (21 ithER#F
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central government in 2018. 117 However, as this research has
revealed, farmers in Chongqing are not the owners of land tickets,
nor has there ever been a real market for these land tickets with prices
determined by supply and demand.
Clearly, the enthusiasm seen for land tickets by the Chongqing
city government, as well as other local governments nationwide, is
rooted in the system's ability to circumvent top-down land use
controls and free up land for urban finance and economic
development. Rural welfare and rights have primarily served as an
excuse to address central government concerns. Whether such
welfare or rights have really improved is questionable indeed,
particularly given farmers' lack of control.
2. Rural Welfare and Rights after the 2008 Sichuan Earthquake:
Land Tickets as Disaster Relief in Chengdu
The Chengdu city government had already been reclaiming rural
land to generate urban land use quotas for a few years before the 2008
Sichuan Earthquake, a practice largely similar to Chongqing's land
tickets. The motivation, unsurprisingly, was circumvention of the
stringent top-down land use control system instituted by the 1998
Land Administration Law, which was enforced primarily by limiting
the urban land use quotas allocated to local governments. However,
rural land reclamation was limited in scale and amount until the 2008
earthquake.118
The general idea of the Chengdu practice was to designate one
area for rural land reclamation and link it with another parcel
designated as an urban development area, with the land use quota
generated from the former used to legalize development in the latter.
From 2006 to 2008, Chengdu carried out 15 such projects, generating
a land use quota of 6980.23 mu and relocating 7578 rural households
17 Notice of the General Office of the State Council on Printing and Distributing (cited in
note 12).
118 Zhou, Return Rights and Empower (cited in note 116).
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comprising 24,869 residents to newer, much less spacious housing,
though arguably of higher quality.119 According to a government
survey conducted in 2006, rural residents in Chengdu occupied an
average of 154 square meters of construction land. If that was
reduced to 70 square meters through rural land reclamation, 650,000
mu worth of land tickets would be generated for the city
government.120 However, the city government could not implement
that plan without approval from the MLR.
The Sichuan Earthquake brought with it the means for the
approval the Chengdu city government sorely needed to further its
ambitious land reclamation initiatives. The city suffered great losses
during the earthquake, with 4,276 deaths, 1,271 missing, and 26,413
injured. Moreover, the earthquake destroyed 490,000 houses, mostly
in rural areas.121 The city government faced a huge challenge in
housing those left homeless by the earthquake. Rebuilding all of the
houses destroyed would have costed roughly RMB 27 billion, double
the average annual fiscal surplus of the Chengdu city government
from 2003 -2007.122 In other words, the city government simply did
not have the money to rebuild houses for its rural residents.
However, it turned that shortfall into a persuasive argument in
requesting MLR approval to expand the scope and amount of rural
land reclamation, as the earthquake had already destroyed
numerous houses in any event. The urgent need for rural housing in
the wake of the earthquake changed the formula of the MLR's policy
considerations. It responded quickly and positively, granting the
Chengdu city government he authority to reclaim rural land for the
purpose of disaster relief. Its approval included three specific items.






122 Zhou, Return Rights and Empower (cited in note 116).
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approval for rural land reclamation.123 Second, it could launch as
many land reclamation projects as it needed, and land use quotas
could be transferred across counties within Chengdu.124 Third, the
Chengdu city government could issue certificates to the holders of
land use quotas, making them both more akin to property rights and
more marketable, in an effort to encourage investment in such
project. 125
These policies served as the institutional foundation for a land
use quota market in Chengdu and the establishment of the Chengdu
Rural Property Rights Exchange in 2010.126 It is quite clear that
without the Sichuan Earthquake and subsequent urgent need for
disaster relief, particularly housing for farmers rendered homeless
by the earthquake, the MLR would not have granted the Chengdu
city government the permission to develop such a market. To
conclude, reframing land reclamation as a means of securing
farmers' rights and welfare played a crucial role in bending the MLR
to the requirements of the Chengdu city government.
CONCLUSION: CONFUSION OVER AND THE DANGER OF TDRs
It is easy to consider TDRs property rights and ignore their
inherently incoherent nature as something in between property
rights and government regulation. However, upon closer
examination of the situation in China, we can see that they actually
pose a serious risk to farmers and have become an alternative means
for local governments to engage in land expropriation. Land ticket
practices have greatly expanded the expropriation power of local
governments. Worse still, as those governments are acting under the
camouflage of land reclamation, it is difficult to hold them
123 Notice of the Ministry of Land Resources on Implementing the Special Support Policy for
Safeguarding Post-Disaster Recovery and Reconstruction, Ministry of Land Resources
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accountable under the existing expropriation regime with its
accompanying protections for farmers, minimal though they be.
This is precisely why local governments have created land ticket
schemes to circumvent the increasingly stringent national regulation
of their expropriation power. By- reframing such schemes as
grounded in rural rights and welfare, those governments have
succeeded in gaining central government acquiescence and even
approval, eventually leading to the creation of a national market of
land use quotas.
For these reasons, it is important to put TDRs back into the
context of takings rather than thinking about them as a form of
property rights. They originate in government regulation, or
regulatory takings, and their expansion poses grave risks to
individual property rights.
There are two different approaches to the Chinese land reform:
one takes property as the "law of things" and emphasizes the
integrity and entirety of land rights for farmers while the other takes
the "bundle of sticks" approach to disintegrate public land
ownership in China. The latter approach has proven flexible and
pragmatic in the Chinese context, but with significant information
and administration costs.127 TDRs have exacerbated the problems of
that approach. The bundle of property rights in China is "maximally
protean and easily reformable."128 It is therefore time to give the
bundle of property rights more concrete meaning and to impose
clearer boundaries between the government and farmers in China. It
is also crucial to understand the political economy behind the
evolution of TDR practices and their impact on interactions between
the central and local governments and between local governments
and farmers.
A national market of transferable land use quotas as proposed in
the aforementioned central government ordinance could expose
hundreds of millions of farmers nationwide to the risk of land
expropriation, counteracting the achievements of the rights
127 See, e.g., Qiao, Stick by Stick? (cited in note 34).
128Id.
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revolution in Chinese national law and politics in the past two
decades. And given the high administrative and information costs
involved, this system is likely to compromise the ordinance's goals
of reducing poverty and promoting inter-regional equality.
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